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Abstract. Energy efficiency has become an important managerial variable of IT
management. Whereas cloud computing promises significantly higher levels of
energy efficiency, it is still not known, if and to what extent outsourcing of
software applications to cloud service providers affects the overall energy efficiency. This research is concerned with the allocation of cloud services from
providers to customers and addresses the problem of energy-aware service allocation. The distributed nature of the problem, i.e., the multiple loci of control,
entails the failure of centralised solutions. Hence, we approach this problem
from a multiagent system perspective, which preserves the distributed setting of
multiple service providers and customers. The contribution of our research is a
game-theoretic framework for analysing service provider and customer interactions and a novel distributed allocation mechanism based on this framework to
approximate energy-efficient, optimal allocations. We demonstrate the usefulness and efficacy of the proposed artifact in several simulation experiments.
Keywords: Game Theory, Green IT, Multiagent Systems, Negotiation, Resource Allocation

1

Introduction

Cloud-based service providers (SPs) such as Amazon and Google offer a portfolio of
cloud services. Customers rent internet-accessible computing resources including
CPU time and data storage services. Customers reserve such resources on demand
without having to face particular operational setup costs [1] and are commonly
charged according to the pricing-schemes “pay-per-use” or subscriptions [2]. Cloud
computing, however, does not only promise significant cost reduction by lower IT
system maintenance and operational costs, but also provides potential for increased
energy efficiency, since the resources of large data centres can be managed more
efficiently [3].
We consider a setting where customers intend to outsource software applications to
cloud-based SPs to reduce costs and energy consumption of their IT systems. Therefore, we address the problem of service allocation from SPs to customers, i.e., the
allocation of individual customer requests to matching available services. When allo-
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cating scarce resources, a typical objective is to find allocations which are optimal
regarding a metric that depends on the preferences of the individual actors. Individual
preferences can be aggregated using the notion of social welfare from welfare economics [4]. We assume that individual actors model their preferences by utility functions and thus apply the concept of utilitarian social welfare, denoting the sum of all
individuals’ utility for a given allocation. However, the problem of finding optimal
allocations is often computationally infeasible in network settings such as in cloud
computing with multiple SPs and customers, since computing optimal allocations is
NP-complete [5].
Resource allocation is a well established field in multiagent systems research [6].
Thus, each actor (i.e., SPs and customers) is represented as a software agent in the
proposed approach. These agents are able to perform autonomous actions in order to
pursue its individual objectives [7]. Participating agents reason about the processes of
coordination among themselves and negotiate bilateral agreements [8]. Existing approaches, however, do not consider energy efficiency, do not address utilitarian social
welfare maximisation, or require a central coordinating agent which does not exist in
the setting considered.
We develop a distributed heuristic for energy-aware cloud service allocation and
evaluate this artifact in a set of experiments to demonstrate its usefulness and efficacy. This research makes two specific contributions: (i) a formal framework for modelling energy-aware cloud service allocation and (ii) a novel distributed allocation
mechanism that integrates energy efficiency into the allocation rationale. The formal
framework is based on game theory which provides formal means to analyse the most
rational choice of actions for the interacting agents. We analyse optimal allocations
based on the proposed framework and show that the utilitarian social welfare maximisation problem is NP-complete. While applying the second-score auction proposed by
Che [9] to our setting, we design a distributed heuristic for this problem as an auctionbased allocation mechanism, where rational SP agents are incentivised to truthfully
reveal private information such as marginal costs.
The allocation mechanism is evaluated by means of multiagent simulation. This
evaluation provides evidence of the mechanism’s efficacy. Since the proposed approach constitutes a heuristic, it does not guarantee optimal solutions but provides
approximations. Another limitation of the mechanism results from the distributed
nature of the problem. There is no central coordinating agent in the setting considered.
Therefore, the communication complexity is relatively high as compared to a centralised heuristic.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the
theoretical background of our research and discuss approaches in the extant literature.
In section 3, we present the formal framework. In section 4, we describe the proposed
allocation mechanism. Section 5 provides the experimental evaluation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2

Related Work

Cloud service allocation is subject of inquiry in both multiagent systems and cloud
computing research. We first introduce constructs of multiagent systems. Then we
employ these constructs as a theoretical lens for reviewing the extant literature.
2.1

Multiagent Systems

Agent Definition. We adopt the definition of agents by Jennings: “An agent is an
encapsulated computer system that is situated in some environment and that is capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment in order to meet its design
objectives” [10]. Apart from mere objects, agents have control over their internal state
and their own behaviour, i.e., they possess autonomy over their choice of action.
Thus, in line with [7], a software agent is specifically designed with the capability to
act independently on behalf of its user or owner. That is, an agent is equipped with
different goals of its user or owner and can discover by itself what needs to be done
for the achievement of these objectives. In the following we investigate agent properties and clarify the implications for our work. These properties include (i)
embeddedness in agent environments, (ii) autonomy, (iii) social ability, and (iv) deliberation and reactivity.
Agent Environment. From a technical perspective, the environment consists of anything an agent can percept through its sensors and act on through its effectors [11].
The emerging organizational context between agents defines the agents’ relationship
with each other [12]. Agent organizations provide a framework of constraints and
expectations about the agents’ behaviour with focus on decision making and action of
specific agents [8]. The agents in our work are designed to take the task-specific roles
of service providers and customers. The underlying organizational structure of this
multiagent system describes the set of the agents’ long-term responsibilities and interaction patterns [13].
Agent Autonomy. Agent autonomy implies that agents have their own goals, i.e., the
agents’ actions are driven by their own interests. Autonomy is always a relational
concept [14]. An agent is autonomous in relation to the influence of other agents and
the agent’s environment, respectively. In our work, autonomous customer agents and
service provider agents are equipped with utilitarian preferences reflecting their own
delegated design objectives. Thus, our agents are self-interested, i.e., they are acting
so to maximise their own utility. Hence, our game-theoretic approach describes the
agents’ autonomy as a relational concept where each individual agent can be viewed
as a player in a negotiation game.
Agent Social Ability. The social ability of agents comprises the ability to communicate and cooperate with other agents. Agents own the ability to interact with other
agents aiming at the satisfaction of their design objectives [7]. However, the agent’s
ability to merely exchange messages with other agents is insufficient from a goal
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autonomy perspective. Since other agents are autonomous themselves, they pursue
their own (potentially conflicting) delegated objectives. Thus, as we cannot assume
agents to share common goals, they must therefore negotiate and cooperate with other
agents to achieve their goals [15]. Customer and service provider agents communicate
by message passing. Messages are defined in the agents’ interaction protocol and
allow them to negotiate for the achievement of individual delegated objectives. In
detail, our agents negotiate about price and energy consumption for the provision of
cloud services.
Agent Deliberation and Reactivity. Deliberation is determining which state of the
world is desirable to be achieved (goals) and how this state can be reached by performing appropriate actions. Reactivity denotes the agents’ capability to sense their
environments and to react upon recognised changes. In environments that involve
dynamic changes (e.g., by other agents), agents must be reactive. However, this does
not imply that the agent is capable of purely reactive behaviour, only. In contrast,
agents reason about appropriate actions to respond to changed in the environment [7].
The environmental changes indirectly affect the agents’ goals. Customer agents
may react to changes in their environment by considering market competition and
demand/supply ratios when requesting for services. Similarly, SP agents may react to
service requests by strategically composing their bids based on market changes.
Multiagent Systems. Considering many real-world scenarios such as the market environment presented in this work, the design of problem solving processes requires
more than a single agent, since there are multiple loci of control, i.e., there is a decentralised nature of the problem [10]. Hence, the agents’ autonomy is of major importance for the applicability in scenarios with multiple, conflicting objectives. Thus
it is necessary to move from the micro level of individual agents to the macro level of
multiagent systems. Following Jennings [10], we use the multiagent-based software
paradigm in order to (i) represent the distributed nature of the problem, (ii) enable
multiple loci of control, and (iii) support competing interests of entities.
Both customer and SP agents act on behalf of independent enterprises that may be
organisationally or geographically distributed. Centralized approaches employing
some kind of global control are not applicable in this setting, as knowledge about data
and resources is private information of the different stakeholders. Distributing control
to multiple entities reduces the system’s control complexity as a whole and causes
individual components to be less coupled [10]. Further, both customer and SP agents
are self-interested agents and pursue their individual business objectives as each agent
tries to maximize its designated utility.
2.2

Energy-aware Service Allocation for Cloud Computing

Energy-efficient Cloud Computing. Most existing approaches addressing energy
efficiency in cloud computing aim at the reduction of energy consumption in a single
data centre. This goal is achieved by scheduling techniques and resource management
for distributing thermal load or powering down server in times of low demand. Most
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of these approaches also fit for conventional data centres which are run and used by
the same enterprise. [16] gives an overview of potential strategies to improve energyefficiency in cloud environments. A theoretical evaluation of scenarios in which cloud
computing has an advantage above local computing resources in terms of energyefficiency is done by [17]. The authors evaluate the balance between computing, storage and network resources on a formal basis. [18] propose a low-energy scheduling
model for the optimisation of energy-efficiency and use a welfare-maximisation approach. However, these approaches are limited to the optimisation of energy efficiency of a single enterprise. A global view on the energy efficiency of cloud computing
and its impact in terms of carbon dioxide emissions is examined in [19].
Agent-based Cloud Service Allocation. Multiagent resource allocation is concerned
with the way resources are distributed among multiple intelligent agents [6]. Though
the notion of a “resource” can be used in its most general way, the resources we consider in this work are computational services. These services are discrete, i.e., they
cannot be divided into smaller units, and non-shareable, i.e., a service cannot be used
by multiple agents at the same time.
Bo and Lesser [5] investigate multiagent resource allocation across computational
networks, where a set of selfish agents route traffic for individual users. Before user
agents can route traffic through node entities, contracts between user agents and the
participating nodes need to be established. The negotiation approach proposed is of
distributed nature, i.e., agents act on behalf of themselves, and the corresponding
resource allocation emerges from sequences of distributed negotiations. In addition to
mutual contracting, nodes are allowed to decommit from existing contracts at a penalty cost. The authors investigate the relationship between stability and optimality of the
network resource allocation game. Parkes et al. [20] present guidelines for the development of distributed allocation mechanism implementations based on the VickreyClarke-Groves [21] mechanism. The aim of the approach is to distribute as much
computation load as possible onto network nodes and thus help to determine a suitable allocation result. However, the proposed approach requires a ‘center’ entity which
communicates with network nodes through a trusted channel and selects and enforces
allocation outcomes.
In [22], a market-based approach is employed to efficiently allocate computing resources by means of an automated negotiation mechanism. Agents make bilateral
contracts for resource leases and are given the ability to decommit from a contract by
paying a negotiated penalty to the other contract party. However, the work above does
not consider energy efficient allocation of computing resources.

3

Formal Framework

This section introduces a formal framework allowing us to calculate the optimal service allocation from a social welfare perspective. By assumption, switching off hosting servers results in the reduction of power consumption. Thus, each customer agent
seeks to migrate all applications (henceforth services) running on the same physical
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machine to cloud-based SP agents. Since these services often depend on each other,
they can only be migrated as bundles of services. However, customer agents will only
move service bundles to cloud-based SP agents (and thus switch off physical servers)
if cloud-based SP agents are able to offer a more energy-efficient way to execute the
designated services. Thus, we assume each SP agent is aware of its energy efficiency.
With regards to the standardized measurement of IT energy efficiency, we employ the
widely accepted metric “performance-per-watt” (see [23] for a justification).
3.1

Agents and Services

To induce a migration decision, agents have to consider services executed on hosts,
computational capacities, as well as energy efficiency specifications.
Agents. The set of customer agents is denoted by AC and the set of SP agents is ASP.
The set of all agents is given by A = AC ASP.
Services. The tuple of all services is denoted by S = (s1,s2,…,sn). Each service has a
required computational capacity given by w(sk) with k {1,…,n} measured in performance, i.e., computing operations per second. For example, a common performance
metric, server side java operations per second (ssj_ops), is defined in
SPECpower_ssj2008 [24]. We assume that different machines support the same performance metric.
Hosts. Each customer agent i AC owns a set of hosts (e.g., servers) denoted by
. The average energy consumption rate (in watt) of
Hi = {h1i,h2i,…,hmii} with mi
each host is given by Ei(hil) with l {1,...,mi }. Each host is defined by the binary tuple
hil = (r1,r2,…,rn), where rk = 1 if service sk is hosted on hli and rk = 0 if not. Due to the
fact that i can only switch off its hosting hardware (and thus enhance its energy efficiency) once all services hosted by that particular hardware are migrated to SP agents,
a customer agent i derives a valuation Vi(hli ) for host hli if all services hosted by hli are
allocated to SP agents.
Capacity. Each SP agent j ASP owns an infrastructure which provides a limited
computational capacity denoted by Wj. Further, the energy efficiency of j is given by
Ej (measured in performance/watt).
3.2

Agent Utility

The agents’ individual utilities are influenced by their costs, payments for service
provisioning, migration valuation and energy savings of specific hosts.
Cost. The cost of SP agent j for providing computational capacity for service sk at
energy consumption rate ek is given by cj(w(sk),ek), where cj(w(sk),ek) = 0 if no service
is provided.
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Payment. The payment from i to j for providing service sk is represented by pijk. Since
i seeks to migrate all services hosted by hli, the total payment for host hli is defined as
the
sum
of
payments
of
all
services
hosted
by
hli,
i.e.

Pi (hli )   jA

SP



n
k 1

l
pijk
where plijk is the price for sk hosted by hli.

Allocation. An allocation is given by the tuple Xijk = (i, j, sk, eijk, pijk), where eijk denotes the contracted energy consumption rate of sk. Let X denote the set of final allocations (“winning” allocations). The binary variable xijk is defined as xijk = 1 if Xijk 株
X, and xijk = 0 otherwise.
Utilities. The utilities of each customer agent i and SP agent j are given by

Ui 

3.3

mi

  (V (h )  P (h )) x
i

j ASP l 1

i
l

i

i
l

ijk

, Uj 

n

 (p

i AC k 1

ijk

 c j ( w( sk ), ek ))xijk .

Optimality of Service Allocations

We consider an allocation being optimal if the sum of all agents’ individual utilities is
maximised. Literature denotes this criterion as utilitarian social welfare, the standard
performance metric in multiagent resource allocation. Such a metric is often used to
measure the quality of an allocation with regards to the system as a whole [6]. The
utilitarian social welfare is calculated as

W

U   U

iAC

i

jASP

j

n
 mi

i
i
V
h

P
h
x

(
(
)
(
))
( pijk  c j ( w( sk ), ek )) xijk 

 i l

i
l
ijk
i , jA  l 1
k 1

mi
n


    Vi (hli ) xijk   c j ( w( sk ), ek ) xijk .
i , jA  l 1
k 1




(1)

Note that the payments do not appear in this equation since these simply redistribute
the wealth between the agents. In the following we are interested in finding the optimal set of services that needs to be allocated to SP agents such that the social welfare
is being maximized, i.e.,

W *  max
x

s.t.

n
 mi

i
V
h
x

(
)

  i l ijk  c j ( w( sk ), ek ) xijk 
i , jA  l 1
k 1


1153

(2)

n

j  ASP :   w( sk ) xijk  W j .

(3)

i AC k 1

Theorem 1. The computation problem for the socially optimal allocation is NPcomplete.
Proof. NP membership is easy, since for any given solution to our allocation problem the calculation of the resulting social welfare and the verification of the capacity
constraints defined in (3) can obviously be done in polynomial time. For hardness, we
define a reduction from the 0-1 Knapsack problem which is known to be NP-complete
[25]. The 0-1 Knapsack problem is defined as follow. Let U be a finite set and let u
U. Further, g(u) denotes the weight and b(u) the valuation of element u, and K is a
positive integer. Further, a(u) is a non-negative integer for each u U. Now maximize



uU

a(u ) b(u ) s.t.  uU a (u ) g (u )  K (cf. [26]). Any instance of the 0-1

Knapsack problem can be reduced to our optimization problem as follows. Let mi = n
= 1 in equation (2), i.e., each customer agent in AC has exactly one service bundle (l =
1) containing exactly one service (k = 1), and let l = 1, i.e., one SP agent only, then
we can rewrite equation (2) as

W *  max  Vi (h1 )  c1 ( w( s1 ), e1 )  xi11
x

with constraint



iAC

(4)

iAC

w( s1 ) xi11  W1 . Further, set AC = U, xi11 = a(u),

Vi(h1) - c1(w(s1),e1) = b1, w(s1) = g(u) for all u U and W1 = K. Obviously, this reduction can be done in polynomial time. Hence, each SP agent’s optimization problem
and therewith the utilitarian social welfare maximization problem is NP-complete.
3.4

Illustrative Example

We provide an example to illustrate the formal framework. This examples considers
two customers c1 and c2, three service providers sp1, sp2, and sp3, and a set of services S = {s1,s2,s3} as depicted in figure 1. Each SP has an energy efficiency Ei in
performance per watt, a capacity Wj in the performance metric ssj_ops, and a cost in €
to provide its services cj with j = {1,2,3}. On the demand side, both c1 and c2 own one
host h1 and derive a valuation Vi(h1) with i = {1,2}, if that particular host can be
switched off. Hence, c1 requests for computing capacities w(s1) and w(s2) and c2 for
w(s3). Table 1 shows all possible service allocations denoted by a1 to a16 and presents
the social welfare achieved by each allocation. For the calculation, customer valuation
and SP cost are used as per computing unit, e.g., the valuation per computing unit of
c1 equals 85.5/450 = 0.19. Obviously, allocation a1 with 85.5 + 41.4 − 26.0 − 27.5
− 27.6 = 45.8 maximizes the social welfare for the given setting.
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service providers
E1 = 1,200 ssj_ops/W
W 1 = 350 ssj_ops
c1(s1) = 26.0 €

sp1

E2 = 1,000 ssj_ops/W
W 1 = 390 ssj_ops
c2(s2) = 27.5 €

sp2

E3 = 1,100 ssj_ops/W
W 1 = 375 ssj_ops
c3(s3) = 27.6 €

customers

c1

V1(h1) = 85.5
w(s1) = 200 ssj_ops
w(s2) = 250 ssj_ops

c2

V2(h1) = 41.4
w(s3) = 230 ssj_ops

sp3

Fig. 1. Example 1 with two customers and three service providers
Table 1. Possible allocations and social welfare for example 1
Service request

a1

a2

a3

a4

a5

a6

a7

a8

a9

a10

a11

a12

a13

a14

a15

a16

sp2

sp3

sp1

sp2

sp3

sp1

sp1

sp2

sp2

sp3

sp3

-

-

-

-

c1

s1
s2

sp1
sp2

sp1

sp2

sp3

sp3

sp1

sp2

sp3

sp1

sp3

sp1

sp2

-

-

-

c2

s3

sp3

sp3

sp1

sp2

sp1

sp2

-

-

-

-

-

-

sp1

sp2

sp3

-

45.8

44.8

45.5

45.6

45.0

45.1

32.0

29.5

31.0

33.5

29.0

34.0

11.5

16.1

13.8

0.0

Social welfare

4

Allocation Mechanism

Since finding the optimal service allocation is a computationally infeasible problem,
we propose a distributed heuristic for energy-aware cloud service allocation in order
to approximate agents’ decision-making. We employ a multi-attribute combinatorial
procurement auction where multiple customer agents request for bundles of energyefficient cloud services from strategic service provider agents. At first, we introduce a
formal auction model and then describe an allocation protocol that is incentivecompatible for SP agents. An auction protocol is called incentive-compatible if it is
each SP agents’ dominant strategy to declare its true preference over the requested
services regardless of other SP agents’ actions [27].
4.1

Auction Model

The agents’ participation in the auction requires service requests and bids as well as a
score combining price with energy consumption.
Request. Each customer agent i
AC requests for service bundles defined by
Ri = (R1i,R2i,…,Rmii), where each service bundle Rli is represented by the binary request
bundle of the form Rli = (r1,r2,…,rn), i.e., rk = 1 if service sk belongs to the requested
bundle and rk = 0 if not.
Score. Let ek denote the energy consumption rate of service sk and pk the price for
service provisioning. For each tuple (ek,pk) we adopt the notion of [9] and define a
quasi-linear scoring function by
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i(sk,

ek, pk) =

i

w(sk)/ek – ipk,

(5)

where i, i 株 温+ are used for scaling purposes. The scoring function is assumed to be
publicly known to all SP agents at the start of bidding. As in [9], we consider the second-score auction where the winning SP agent is obligated to match the second
highest score. However, in meeting this score, the winner may choose any tuple
(ek,pk). As an example, let SP agent A’s bid for service s1 be (5, 0.2) and
B’s bid (6, 0.15), and the scoring function is such that i(s1, 5, 0.2) = 10 and
i(s1, 6, 0.15) = 9. Here, SP agent A wins the auction and is free to choose any tuple
(e’,p’) such that i(s1, e’, p’) = 9 is fulfilled.
Bids. Each SP agent j’s bid is given by the n-tuple Bj = (Bj1,Bj2,…,Bjn), where each Bjk
is a tuple of the form Bjk = ( i(sk, ek, pk), ek) with the score i(sk, ek, pk), and the promised energy consumption rate ek for providing service sk. If j does not bid for service
sk, we set Bjk = (0,0).
4.2

Auction Protocol

We consider the widely used one-shot protocol described in [28]. Further, our protocol is assumed to be individually rational, i.e., no agent will commit to a contract for
service provision if its cost exceeds the payment received. This is natural as no agent
is willing to participate in an auction where it spends more than what it earns. In the
following we describe the individual steps of the protocol.
Each customer agent i asks for bids from SP agents by announcing its request
Ri = (Ri1,Ri2,…,Rimi) to all SP agents.
For each service sk in i’s request bundles Ril, SP agents send their binding bids Bi to
customer agents.
Customer agent i evaluates the received bids and informs SP agents about the acceptance of their bids by transferring the second highest score.
The winning SP agents calculate the price based on the second highest score. A
contract is established and second score payments are transferred. For each rejected
bid, no contract is established.
Since customer agent i only derives non-zero valuations for complete service bundles,
it is individually rational for i to establish contracts if and only if it has received acceptable bids for each service in the current bundle. Once this is the case, i selects the
SP agent with the highest score for each requested service. The winning SP agent is
then informed about the acceptance of its bid and the value of the auction’s second
highest score denoted by i,2. Based on the scoring function defined in (5), the winning SP agent chooses an energy-price tuple (e’,p’) such that i(sk, ek, pk) = i,2. A
contract is established for each service sk within the bundle specifying the price p’ and
the energy consumption e’ for service sk .
Note that SP agents may choose to lie when bidding, i.e., they may systematically
overvalue their offered energy efficiency and base the transmitted score defined in (5)
on costs that are higher than its true valuation. In the following we apply [9] and show
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that this protocol is incentive-compatible for SP agents, i.e., it is each SP agent’s
dominant strategy to declare its true preferences for service allocations. Thus, each
individually rational SP agent will always calculate its bidding score on its true marginal cost.
Theorem 2. The proposed auction protocol is incentive-compatible for SP agents,
where each SP agent’s bid for providing service sk is calculated using
pijk = cj(w(sk),eijk).
Proof. Applying lemma 1 from [9], we set q = ek,s(q) = iw(sk)/ek, c(q, )
= icj(w(sk), ek) and qs( ) = eijk. Then eijk = arg max( iw(sk)/ek – icj(w(sk),ek)) which
reduces the two-dimensional auction to a one-dimensional problem. Hence, proposition 1 (ii) in [9] yields pijk = icj(w(sk),eijk). Consequently, SP agents’ dominant strategy consists in calculating their bidding scores based on their marginal costs
cj(w(sk),eijk).
From this result it becomes clear that SP agents will always calculate their score
based on their true marginal cost, no matter on how other SP agents choose their
score. With this in mind, we can deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For a single customer agent request, the proposed protocol results in an
optimal service allocation.
Proof. By theorem 2, it is individually rational for each SP agent to calculate its bid
for providing service sk by using its marginal cost cj(w(sk),ek). That is, only SP agents
that offer minimal cost will be contracted by the customer agent. As customer agent’s
valuation for each service bundle hil is given by Vi(hil) and costs cj(w(sk),ek) are minimized, the resulting service allocation is optimal.

5

Evaluation

This section provides the experimental evaluation of the proposed allocation mechanism. We describe the experimental setup, report the results, and discuss the findings.
5.1

Experimental Setup

The parameters used in our experiments are based on pricing models of Amazon in
2012 and latest power and performance information found in the SPECpower standard. According to the Amazon EC2 User Guide and SPECpower, the performance of
a Dell PowerEdge R720 approximately corresponds to the computing capabilities of
88 EC2 small instances [24]. Hence, on average, one million ssj_ops cost 6.75 € and
consume 186 Watt power. Thus, in our setup, costs are normally distributed with c =
6.75 and standard deviation c = 0.1. Based on Amazon and SPECpower data, the
energy efficiency of SPs and customer agents’ hosts are assumed to follow a normal
distribution with expectation E = 5365 ssj_ops/W and E = 268.2. We assume that SP
agents’ costs correlate positively with its energy efficiency. The following random
numbers were generated using normal distribution:
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Xc,j ~ N( c; c2) refers to SP agent j's fixed cost component incurred for service
provisioning,
XE,j ~ N( E; E2) refers to SP agent j's energy efficiency,
cj = Xc,j (XE,j / E) refers to SP agent j's cost for one million ssj_ops,
Xc,j ~ N( c; c2) refers to customer agent i's fixed valuation component,
Vi(hli) = Xc,j + E / XE,j) refers to customer agent i's valuation per computing unit for
host hli .
The number of hosts per customer agent is Poisson distributed with an expectation
k = 10. The number of services per host is also Poisson distributed with an expectation s = s and each service is taken by uniform distribution from a set of 10 services
with performance ranging from 0.3 to 2.1 million ssj_ops. The number of SP agents is
set to 5 as we assume there exists a relatively small number of large cloud SPs on the
market, e.g., Amazon and IBM. SP agents’ computational capacities are generated by
normal distribution such that demand and supply are balanced at 50 customer agents.
Each experiment was performed 100 times. The optimal values of the allocations’
social welfare are computed using CPLEX (a commercial optimization software by
IBM).
5.2

Results

Both figures 2 and 3 show the average behaviour of the utility ratio (agents’ social
welfare relative to optimal utility) as a function of the number of customer agents
where energy efficiency and price are weighted using three different ratios. Different
weights can be set by means of i and i as defined in the scoring function (5) and are
equal for all customer agents. In the following, energy-price weighting ratios are
simply written in the form energy:price (e.g., 1:1 means energy and price are
weighted equally).
Figure 2 shows a setting where higher weights are placed on energy efficiency. The
utility ratio at 1:1 monotonically increases in the interval [2,44] until the maximum
close to 1.0 is reached at 44 customer agents. The utility ratio then decreases again
and seemingly converges to 0.9. Similarly, the utility ratio for 3:2 also increases in the
interval [2,44], but starts at a lower utility ratio as compared to the function with 1:1,
showing a higher slope. It then decreases and indicates a convergence to the utility
ratio of 0.9. Further, the utility ratio for 4:1 is significantly low for a small number of
customer agents while it increases at a high slope until the maximum close to 1.0 is
reached at 44 customer agents. Hence, it finally decreases and reaches a utility ratio of
0.9.
Figure 3 shows a setting where higher weights are placed on price rather than on
energy efficiency. The utility ratio with 1:1 is the same as the one displayed in figure
2. At 2:3 the utility ratio dominates the one for 1:1 and increases monotonically in the
interval [2,44] until the maximum close to 1.0 is reached at customer agent number
44. Similarly, the weights 1:4 cause the utility ratio to exceed all other ratios while
constantly remaining close to 1.0 in the interval [2,44]. It then decreases for a growing
number of customer agents and reaches a utility ratio of 0.9.
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Fig. 2. Utility ratio as function of customer
number with higher weights on energy.

5.3

Fig. 3. Utility ratio as function of customer
number with higher weights on price.

Discussion

Our experiments demonstrate the influence of energy-aware customer agents on the
agents’ social welfare and provide evidence for the usefulness and efficacy of the
proposed auction mechanism. In the interval [2,44] all “energy-aware” utility ratios
displayed in figure 2 increase monotonically. This result demonstrates the impact of
the changing demand/supply-ratio with an increasing number of customer agents:
Within the interval [2,48], on average, service supply is greater than the requested
service demand. Hence, on a market with excess supply, energy-aware customer
agents easily satisfy their demand and choose energy-efficient services. The incurring
costs of SP agents, however, are high when providing services of high energy efficiency. Therefore, customer agents that overvalue energy efficiency as compared to
price will purchase services from expensive SP agents. Hence, capacities of cheap SP
agents remain unused.
Since the social welfare decreases at higher SP agent costs and unchanging customer agent valuation, both utility ratios for 4:1 and 3:2 are low for a small number of
customer agents but increase until the market is saturated (on average, this happens at
50 customer agents). That is, increasing weights for energy efficiency result in higher
costs for service provisioning and hence in lower utility ratios. When the market is
balanced, the utility ratios reach its maximum for all energy-price weights. The fact
that the utility ratios then decrease within the interval [46,100] is intuitive: Once services for sale are beginning to be scarce, resource competition is high and the mechanism can only achieve a high social welfare if services of high valuation can be migrated to SP agents. In such situations, customer agents are willing to forgo their energy-price preferences in order to obtain their valuations. Further, with a growing
number of customer agents, the success rate of the mechanism decreases as it becomes more difficult for competing customer agents to migrate their services. Hence,
the utility ratios for all energy-price preferences reach 0.9.
Experiments for the setting with “price-aware” customer agents as displayed in
figure 3 confirm a rather trivial intuition: When placing higher weights on the price
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and lower weights on energy efficiency (e.g., 1:4), the mechanism achieves a constant
maximal utility ratio close to 1.0. Obviously, in a market with low competition, customer agents acquire services from SP agents with lowest cost while paying only little
attention to energy efficiency. Once resources are being scarce (i.e., beyond 50 customer agents), the high competition among customer agents causes the utility ratio to
finally reach 0.9 for all considered energy-price preferences.

6

Conclusion

This work presents a formal framework for modelling energy-aware cloud service
allocation and proposes a distributed allocation mechanism that integrates energy
efficiency into the allocation rationale. Customers and cloud SPs are represented as
software agents that autonomously negotiate service agreements based on a set of
different energy-price preference ratios. We employ game theory to analyse optimal
service allocation and show the NP-completeness of the underlying utilitarian social
welfare maximisation problem. We develop a distributed heuristic for the allocation
problem. The proposed allocation mechanism, a second-score auction protocol, is
shown to be incentive-compatible for SP agents. We evaluate this mechanism by
means of multiagent simulation. The current formal framework is limited to two nonfunctional properties of services, i.e., energy efficiency and performance. In our future work, we plan to include additional properties such as response time and availability.
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